Thursday last I tried, once again, to explain the restrictive covenant rules in proposed section 56.4 of the Income Tax Act (Canada) to a seminar hosted by the Hamilton Law Association (please send an email to me if you would like a copy of the PowerPoint presentation). I’m not sure how well I succeeded. I find the rules difficult to work with and impossible to explain because they are so full of apparently random tricks and traps.
For example, assume that A owns all of the shares of Holdco and A is selling the shares. The purchaser requires A to provide a non-compete and the parties allocate an amount to the non-compete. The default rule is that A must include in income all of the amount allocated (see subsection 56.4(2)). The amount can be treated as, in effect, proceeds of disposition of the shares if the exception in paragraph 56.4(3)(c) applies. That exception applies, however, only if the shares being sold constitute an “eligible interest”, and they will constitute an eligible interest only if
- they are shares of a corporation that carries on a business, or
- they are shares of a corporation 90% or more of the fair market value of which is attributable to eligible interests in one other corporation.
It appears that the Holdco shares will not be an eligible interest in the following circumstances (among many others, it seems):
- Holdco owns portfolio securities with a value that is more than 10% of the net value of all of the assets of Holdco. As a result, the Holdco shares would not be an eligible interest of A. But it seems that this problem could be solved by transferring the assets to Opco under section 85 (where they have no business being, in the real world).
- Holdco owns Opco and Realco. Realco owns the real property from which Opco carries on its business, and the Realco shares represent more than 10% of the net value of all of the assets of Holdco. The Holdco shares would not be an eligible interest of A. It seems that this problem could be solved, however, by amalgamating Opco and Realco. The purchaser will likely want to spin the real property out of Amalco into another holding company owned by Holdco immediately after the sale, at some expense, but never mind.
- Opco owes a significant debt to Holdco because, over the years, Opco has paid dividends of its earnings to Holdco, and Holdco has loaned the funds back to Opco and taken back notes secured by the assets of Opco. The notes represent more than 10% of the net value of all of the assets of Holdco. The Holdco shares, then, would not be an eligible interest of A. The problem, however, could be solved simply by converting the notes to shares before the sale.
Frankly, these are the kinds of rules that give tax lawyers a bad name. No wonder that, to some, we appear as priests of some sinister cult that requires a blood sacrifice from time to time to propitiate the angry gods. These rules defy common sense, and the proof is in the easy fixes that are available to solve the problems outlined above, if one only knows that the problems exist in the first place. Can anyone explain to me the policy rationale underlying these rules?
I am not a tax guy but I have tried to read the section and just get bogged down as well. It occurs to me however that if, as you suggest, the effect of the exception is having the $ treated as proceeds of disposition (but for some reason not calling them that) then CRA must feel they need to graft on the rules which restrict the enhanced capital gains exemption to prevent anyone who got a non-compete from sheltering it. Otherwise you could create more exemptions without complying with the 2 year rule. Hence you see the 90% rule, bias against passive assets etc.
Because I do not understand the new section ( and have yet to speak with anyone who confidently feels that he or she does) I have reverted to my pre Fortino world in which I do not carve out non-compete payments, take the position that a non-compete obligation is only one of many obligations in the agreement and cannot be valued in $ by CRA more readily than any other individual obligation in the agreement, and hence all monies are received by the vendor/shareholders as proceeds of disposition. If anyone believes this to be wrong, naive or for any other reason will get me in trouble, please set me straight.
> Because I do not understand the new section (and have yet to speak
> with anyone who confidently feels that he or she does) I have
> reverted to my pre Fortino world in which I do not carve out
> non-compete payments, take the position that a non-compete
> obligation is only one of many obligations in the agreement and
> cannot be valued in $ by CRA more readily than any other individual
> obligation in the agreement, and hence all monies are received by
> the vendor/shareholders as proceeds of disposition. If anyone
> believes this to be wrong, naive or for any other reason will get me
> in trouble, please set me straight.
Pat, I think many or most lawyers are taking this approach. At the HLA
seminar, several of the lawyers present volunteered that they are not
receiving any instructions from accountants on how to work with the
rules.
The fact is that section 56.4 could be one of the biggest game-
changers to come along in years, or it might be something that
comes up only rarely, relatively speaking. The question is whether the
CRA wants to start picking fights with taxpayers over non-
competes. What is clear from the draft legislation is that the CRA
will have the power to do so: the legislation amends section 68 of the
Income Tax Act to allow the CRA to second-guess the allocation of the
purchase price arrived at by arm’s-length parties so that a portion of
the price is allocated to a restrictive covenant.